Richard Holbrooke is President Barack Obama's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is also founder of the American Academy in Berlin.
SZ: It seems there is immense speed in approaching the Taliban. Why this rush?
Richard Holbrooke: I would question the premise that there is immense speed. I think there is immense journalistic speculation. Let's distinguish very clearly between reintegration and reconciliation. Reintegration was discussed in London. It is a process in which local commanders and local people fighting with the Taliban, people who are not committed to al-Qaeda or to the odious social policies of the Taliban, are welcomed back into Afghan society on the basis of renouncing violence and adhering to the constitution. This program is desperately needed, because we are not going to succeed by trying to kill every last person who is fighting with the Taliban. On the other hand, reconciliation is the idea of a political deal with the Taliban. That's not taking place at this point. There are private contacts between people and the Taliban, and there have been informal contacts ever since the war began. But there have been no official conversations, and none are in the works. There are no US direct contacts with Taliban leadership. The speculations run way ahead of the reality.
SZ: What about the unofficial contacts? Can they become more serious?
Holbrooke: It's true that informal talks have been taking place in various places. But the Taliban themselves have denounced every contact when they were made public.
SZ: Should there be any ground rules for those conversations?
Holbrooke: The Secretary of State and the President have laid out very clearly the red lines. They have to be ready to denounce al-Qaeda and participate peacefully in the evolution of Afghan political life. There is also a very serious issue about the role of women. We cannot have a situation where the Taliban once again impose their attitudes towards women on society.
SZ: How about the strength of the Taliban? There are conflicting reports about their morale and battle preparedness.
Holbrooke: There are conflicting views because there is conflicting evidence, depending on where you look. Taliban propaganda suggests that they are very concerned about the reintegration program, because they have been attacking it now for weeks, long before it was announced. They are under tremendous pressure both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it's very hard to make a general statement. This war is conducted on a local level throughout the country.
SZ: Is talking to Mullah Omar and the core of the Taliban an imaginable option?
Holbrooke: The hardcore of the Taliban, the supreme Shura hiding in Pakistan, has never indicated the slightest interest in talking. Nor have they shown the slightest interest in breaking with al-Qaeda.
SZ: Are these preconditions?
Holbrooke: We are not in a position to discuss the future of Afghanistan with people of that sort under the current circumstances. Until they indicate that they are ready to break with al-Queda, I don't see a basis on which any progress is possible. Having said that, I want to emphasize that this war will not end on a deck of a battleship like World War II, or at a place like Dayton, Ohio, like the Bosnian war.
SZ: President Karzai just announced that he will hold a jirga in spring. What, in your view, is the use of it?
Holbrooke: To rally the people behind the policies of the government. It's part of Afghan tradition to hold jirgas to create a national consensus that cuts across ethnic lines. I greatly respect the jirga system because it stems out of organic traditions of the Afghan people.
SZ: The Pakistani government is not taking part in the jirga but is crucial to the future of the process. How much can it help on the reconciliation issue?
Holbrooke: The Taliban leadership took up sanctuary in Pakistan over the last eight years. Therefore, what happens in Pakistan is of immense importance for the future of Afghanistan. And the reverse is true as well. We are therefore engaged in intensive discussions with Pakistan over those issues.
SZ: Are you demanding more action in dealing with the Taliban?
Holbrooke: We are very gratified that the Pakistani army took action in Swat and South Waziristan last year. We would support anything they did to continue to put more pressure on the Taliban.
SZ: Is the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, fully committed?
Holbrooke: The ISI is probably the most talked about intelligence service in the world these days. I myself have good relations with the Director General of the ISI, General Pasha. He assures me that his government is doing what it can to deal with this problem. We encourage them, but I am not going to second guess them in public.
SZ: One of the eternal fears of the Pakistani government is a threat from India. Isn't it time now to bring India into the talks?
Holbrooke: Relations between India and Pakistan are critical for peace and stability in the entire region. We would encourage the two sides in any way possible to improve their relations, but we are not going to act as an intermediary. That is for the two countries to do themselves. As for Kashmir: I do not work on the Kashmir issue. There is a theory among some people that Kashmir is the key to the Afghan situation. I simply do not agree with that judgement. The issue of Kashmir has existed since the independence of India and Pakistan, in 1947. To link it to other issues is only to complicate everything even more.
SZ: The sense of urgency also comes from President Obama's withdrawal date. Is he creating too much pressure?
Holbrooke: Remember what the President said: He would begin a responsible transition of security authority and responsibility to the Afghan security forces in July 2011. And he would begin the withdrawals of some American troops. He did not lay out a timetable other than the start date.
SZ: So, should we forget about the date?
Holbrooke: Absolutely not. That is a firm date for the beginning of the withdrawal. But let us not confuse the beginning of withdrawals with the timetable for full withdrawal, which is what some people have done. This is because we believe this is the best way to encourage the Afghans to take responsibility step by step.