The conflict in Afghanistan impacts us all, and failure there will have tremendous consequences for every Nato member state. This is far more than a ''war on terrorism''. It is an ideological struggle between two different worldviews, for which the cold war may provide a constructive comparison.
The conference in Munich has long been the most important international security conference in the world. When I first attended it as American ambassador to Germany in 1994, it was focused almost entirely on strategic issues related to the transatlantic relationship. Today, the conference's organizers have moved far beyond its original cold war confines and have dramatically expanded its participation to address current global security issues. In Munich this weekend, Nato defense ministers will mingle easily with leaders from Russia, Georgia and Ukraine, India and Pakistan, Israel and Jordan, Japan and China. Two years ago, the conference gave a special award to a guest whose very participation would have been unthinkable only a few years earlier: the secretary general of the United Nations.
This is entirely as it should be. The conditions and concerns that brought the leaders of what was then called the ''Free World'' together for the first three decades of this conference no longer exist. The original reasons for the creation of Nato have been achieved beyond anyone's highest hopes - without a single shot being fired in anger during the cold war. Europe is free, and the European Union has brought increasing stability to those countries that are part of it. The very definition of ''Europe'' has changed as the EU has expanded eastward. There is, in this story, genuine cause for congratulations. The EU, despite many unresolved issues - especially Turkey's place in Europe - has proved the genius of its founders, no matter how different today's EU is in practice from some of their early (and not always identical) dreams. And Russia, while hardly a paragon of democratic values, is no longer a clear and present danger to the West.
The year since the last Munich Conference, however, has not gone well for the United States and its close allies. By any standard, Iraq is in worse shape than a year earlier. The stated objectives of the Bush administration (''a democratic Iraq that can govern, sustain, and defend itself'') is unattainable in any reasonable period of time, even with a huge increase in American military and civilian resources. The once-bright prospects for Afghanistan have diminished greatly. Despite Iran's weak non-oil economy and growing internal dissent, the odious regime in Tehran has made significant international gains, notably in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and western Afghanistan.
On Nato's critically-important eastern flank, Turkey is torn by disagreement on whether to continue to seek EU membership despite many signs that the EU will continue to throw new obstacles in its path. Meanwhile, a resurgent Moscow intrigues in some of the independent states that were once part of the USSR, uses energy as a weapon of intimidation, and appears to be implicated in cold war style murders in both Moscow and abroad.
As for Darfur - much discussed at last year's Munich Conference - now, one year later, things have gotten worse. The international peacekeeping force, authorized by the UN Security Council eight months ago and essential to stem the genocide, has been blocked by Sudanese opposition and insufficient pressure from the authorizing powers, especially the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, which voted for the resolution but have done virtually nothing to implement it.
The biggest test in Nato's history
Today's threats require the same strong, collective leadership that marked the best moments of the cold war and, after three years of hesitation, Bosnia. That, in turn, requires a clear consensus on the nature of the threat, a common strategy, and adequate resources from the Nato member states and likeminded nations.
Yet the backlash against American leadership as a result of the Iraq disaster has severely weakened the sense of common purpose just when it is most needed. Nevertheless, self-interest must ultimately trump anger toward Washington. The fact remains that the nations that once banded together to resist totalitarianism from the Soviet Union now face another kind of totalitarian threat, one that does not respect international borders. They must act in concert to deal with it.
The biggest test in Nato's history has already arrived: Afghanistan. Nato will be involved in Afghanistan long after Iraq has wound its way toward conclusion. Failure in Afghanistan would return it to control by the Taliban and al-Qaeda - an unacceptable outcome for every Nato nation and many others.
In Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, the original commitment was unassailable, unanimously supported by the United Nations, and greeted with great enthusiasm and initial success. But the Pentagon unwisely rejected early offers from France, Germany, and the UK to make Afghanistan a Nato project, followed by Washington's historic mistake of turning to Iraq before the job in Afghanistan was even close to completion.
By the time Washington understood that things were not going well in Afghanistan, it was 2006 and the United States was trapped in Iraq's ''thankless deserts'' (Churchill's phrase). When I visited the country in April of last year, almost every international official and senior military officer knew what was happening, but Washington was in denial; after writing about the problems in Afghanistan, I received calls from very senior US officials telling me I was too pessimistic. Incredibly, the State Department and the White House drastically cut economic assistance. By the middle of 2006, the Pentagon was finally ready to turn part of the command over to Nato, but primarily to free up troops for Iraq.
Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that some Nato nations hung back, limiting the size or role of their forces in Afghanistan. But no matter how other nations feel about American behavior in recent years, the fact is that Afghanistan is a common problem; failure there would have terrible consequences for every Nato member.
Such issues should have been resolved at the Nato summit in Riga last December, but they were not. Some progress was made, however, in reducing the number and nature of the socalled ''national caveats,'' an unfortunate arrangement that allows each nation sending troops to a Nato mission to lay out specific circumstances and rules for the use of its own troops. In truth, such caveats erode the basic concepts of a unified command, and should be eliminated entirely. (There are other ways for each nation to protect its own troops from an unwise deployment if that becomes necessary.)
Far more than a ''war on terrorism''
Beyond the issue of national caveats, the larger concern must be addressed: Whether the Nato nations are ready to redefine their mission and use the unparalleled resources of the member states to deal with, and ultimately defeat, the forces that threaten all those - Christians, Jews, and Muslims alike - who wish to live in a free and tolerant and progressive world? On the answer to this question much will depend.
This is, of course, far more than a ''war on terrorism''; it is an ideological struggle between two visions of the world, similar in that respect to the cold war. Of course, the Munich Conference cannot give a definitive answer; that will require consensus among the highest leaders of the alliance and the support of other major powers. But those assembled in Munich can, and must, recognize that we cannot afford many more years like the last one. Regaining the initiative will take leadership on both sides of the Atlantic, a successful disengagement from Iraq, and a turnaround in Afghanistan. And it will take time.
Richard Holbrooke, former US ambassador to the United Nations and chief architect of the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia, is the founding chairman of the American Academy in Berlin.
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8.2.2007, in cooperation with American Academy Berlin)